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Hendricks v. Sanks: One Small Step for the Continued
Parental Support of Disabled Children Beyond the Age of
Majority in North Carolina
The cost of raising and caring for a disabled child can be a
significant hardship on a family.' This hardship is exacerbated for
divorced, custodial parents who must rely on court-ordered child
support to meet increased childcare expenses. These expenses,
unfortunately, do not dissipate once a disabled child reaches the age
of majority.3 In North Carolina, however, the obligation of a parent
to support her child usually terminates when the child reaches the age
of majority,4 regardless of whether the child is incapacitated because
of a disability.5 The only exception to the cessation of this obligation
arises when the child is enrolled in primary or secondary school and is
making satisfactory progress toward graduation-no exception based
on the child's disability exists.6 In any event, even if the disabled child
qualifies for continued support under this education exception, the
obligation of the non-custodial parental support ends when the child
reaches the age of twenty.7
This Recent Development reviews the development and
subsequent retrenchment of a parent's duty to support her disabled
1. See, e.g., Jiyeon Park et al., Impacts of Poverty on Quality of Life in Families of
Children with Disabilities,68 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 151, 152 (2002) (noting that 28%
of disabled children, ages three to twenty-one, are living in families whose total income is
below the poverty threshold set by the U.S. Census Bureau). In contrast, only 16% of
children without disabilities in the same age group live in poverty. Id.
2. See Aaron Donovan, Children's Long-Term Illnesses Mean a Strain on Families'
Resources, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 2001, at 1A-44 (noting that parents of disabled or
chronically ill children face increased rates of divorce and are often saddled with financial
burdens when expenses are not covered by government programs, such as Medicaid).
3. See Barbara Whitaker, A Plan for Parents of Disabled Children: Building the
Road to Long-Term Care, Special Needs Planning, at http://www.specialneedsplanning.
com/nad/Plan-forParents-of-DisabledChildren.html (last visited May 4, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing financial planning for the long-term care
of disabled children).
4. The age of majority is eighteen years in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-2
(2001).
5. § 50-13.4(c) ("Payments ordered for the support of a child shall terminate when
the child reaches the age of [eighteen].").
6. § 50-13.4(c)(2) (establishing a two-year educational exception for the termination
of child support at the age of eighteen years).
7. Id. (mandating the termination of child support once the child graduates from
school, ceases to regularly attend school, or reaches the age of twenty years, regardless of
the child's circumstances).
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child past the age of majority in North Carolina.8 Against this
historical backdrop, it examines the recent decision by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals in Hendricks v. Sanks,9 which addresses
whether a disabled child enrolled in a non-traditional curriculum
qualifies for continued parental support past the age of majority
under the statutory education exception provided in section 5013.4(c) of the General Statutes of North Carolina.' ° Finally, this
Recent Development argues that North Carolina should reinstate
statutory provisions mandating post-majority parental support for
disabled children for public policy reasons and to align North
Carolina with the majority of jurisdictions providing for such
support."
Historically, most jurisdictions, including North Carolina, have
followed the common law rule that parents are not obligated to
support their adult children.'2 Many jurisdictions, however, provided
an exception to this rule for physically or mentally disabled children
who, upon reaching the age of majority, were unable to care for
themselves. 3 In North Carolina, a parent had a common law
obligation to provide the necessary support to his child, who, before
and after reaching age twenty-one, is and continues to be insolvent,
unmarried, and mentally or physically incapable of sustaining
himself.14 In 1967, the General Assembly codified the common law

8. See infra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
9. 143 N.C. App. 544,545 S.E.2d 779 (2001).
10. See infra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 44-93 and accompanying text.
12. See generally M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Parent's Obligation to Support Adult
Child, 1 A.L.R.2d 910 (1948) (citing cases from thirty-seven states, including North
Carolina, that adhered to the common law rule that a parent is not obligated to support an
adult child).
13. See id. (listing cases in fourteen states, including North Carolina, that at one time
provided for continued support at common law for disabled children beyond the age of
majority); see also 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Settlement § 1007 (2000) (reviewing child
support provisions for disabled children beyond the age of majority). See generally
Noralyn 0. Harlow, Annotation, Postmajority Disability as Reviving Parental Duty to
Support Child, 48 A.L.R.4th 919 (1986) (reasoning that a disabled child remains a minor in
the eyes of the law because the disability prevents the child from becoming emancipated).
14. Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 616, 44 S.E.2d 31, 33 (1947) (addressing whether a
father is obligated to support a mentally or physically disabled child beyond the age of
twenty-one). At common law, the age of majority was twenty-one years. See id. at 617, 44
S.E.2d at 33. The General Assembly abrogated the common law definition of minority in
1971. Act of June 17, 1971, ch. 585, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 510, 510 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-1 (2001)); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-2 (2001)
(defining "minor" as anyone who has not turned eighteen years old). Following the
enactment of this statute, parents no longer have an obligation to support their children
after they reach the age of eighteen years. See Gates v. Gates, 69 N.C. App. 421, 427, 317
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obligation of parents to support their disabled children beyond the
age of majority. 5 This statute authorized a trial court to award
custody of and support for a mentally or physically disabled child,
even if the child had reached the age of majority. 6
In 1971, however, the General Assembly took its first step in
diluting a parent's obligation to support her disabled child by
exempting parents from the financial liability of the care of a child
who is a long-term patient at a state owned or operated mental health
facility. 7 The General Assembly further amended section 50-13.8 in

1979 by removing the obligation of support for a disabled child
beyond the age of majority, while retaining the custody provisions for
such children. 8 After these amendments, section 50-13.4, and not
section 50-13.8, governs child support provisions. 9 Although the
removal of the statutory obligation of parents to support their
disabled children beyond the age of majority created an inconsistency
between the child support provisions in section 50-13.4 and the child
custody provisions in section 50-13.8, these amendments do not
appear to be a legislative oversight. 2 °
S.E.2d 402, 406 (1984), affd per curiam, 312 N.C. 620, 323 S.E.2d 920 (1985); Crouch v.
Crouch, 14 N.C. App. 49,51, 187 S.E.2d 348,349 (1972).
15. Act of July 6, 1967, ch. 1153, § 2, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1772, 1777 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.8 (2001)) (providing at that time, "[f]or the purposes
of custody and support, the rights of a person who is mentally or physically incapable of
self-support upon reaching his majority shall be the same as a minor child for so long as he
remains mentally or physically incapable of self-support") (emphasis added). See
generally 2 SuzANNE REYNOLDS, LEE'S NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 10.21 (5th
ed. 1993) (reviewing the development and subsequent retrenchment of a parent's
obligation to support his disabled child past the age of majority in North Carolina).
16. See Speck v. Speck, 5 N.C. App. 296,302-03, 168 S.E.2d 672, 677-78 (1969).
17. Act of April 21, 1971, ch. 218, § 3, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 158, 159 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.8 (2001)) (amending section 50-13.8 to provide that
"no parent may be held liable for the charges made by a facility owned or operated by the
State Department of Mental Health for the care, maintenance and treatment of such
person who is a long term patient"). The General Assembly repealed this provision in
1979. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 838, § 29, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1112, 1132 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.8 (2001)).
18. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1132 (deleting the words "and support" from section 5013.8). The 1979 amendments to section 50-13.8 were included in Senate Bill 124, a general
appropriations bill for current operations of state departments. Id. at 1112-13.
19. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4 (2001) (governing actions for support of minor
children).
20. For example, the General Assembly could have rectified this inconsistency in
1989, but instead chose to amend the catch line of section 50-13.8 to reflect the deletion of
the child support provisions. See Act of June 5, 1989, ch. 210, § 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws
461, 461-62 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.8 (2001)) (deleting "support" from the
catch line). The vote to amend the catch line to section 50-13.8 under Senate Bill number
532 was 44-0 in the Senate. Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of North
Carolina, 1st Sess. 257, 264 (1989). The vote was 87-0 in the House of Representatives.
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The General Assembly amended section 50-13.4 in 1983 to allow
a court discretion in ordering child support beyond the age of
21
eighteen if the child still attended primary or secondary school.
Additional amendments to section 50-13.4(c) enacted in 1993 require
such support unless the court, in its discretion, orders the support to

cease or finds that the child is failing to make satisfactory progress
toward graduation. 2 Thus, in North Carolina, a non-custodial
parent's obligation to support her child past the age of majority now
depends upon whether the child is enrolled in primary or secondary
school and making progress toward graduation, not upon whether the
child has an incapacitating disability.'
Since 1979, North Carolina case law has upheld the lack of a
statutory obligation on the part of parents to support their disabled
children beyond the age of majority. 24 For example, in Yates v.

Dowless, 5 the court of appeals reversed a lower court decision that
ordered a parent to pay "continuing ongoing child support without
regard to the child's chronological age. '26 Likewise, in Jackson v.
Jackson,27 the court of appeals held that the 1979 amendments to

section 50-13.8 abrogated a parent's obligation to support his child
beyond the age of majority.2
Hendricks v. Sanks29 recently required the court of appeals to

decide whether the education exception provided in section 5013.4(c)(2) applies to disabled children enrolled in a non-traditional
Journal of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of North Carolina, 1st
Sess. 878, 887 (1989).
21. Act of March 10, 1983, ch. 54, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 34 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c) (2001)).
22. Act of July 13, 1993, ch. 335, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 1036 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.4(c) (2001)).
23. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c)(2) (2001).
24. The courts, however, were slow to grasp the fact that section 50-13.8 no longer
provided for the continued support of disabled children beyond the age of majority. See,
e.g., Bridges v. Bridges, 85 N.C. App. 524,528,355 S.E.2d 230,232 (1987) (concluding that
North Carolina courts lack the authority to order support for adult children except in cases
of mental or physical handicap); Appelbe v. Appelbe, 75 N.C. App. 197, 198, 330 S.E.2d
57,58 (1985) (reaching the same conclusion in dicta).
25. 93 N.C. App. 787, 379 S.E.2d 79 (1989), affd per curiam, 325 N.C. 703, 386 S.E.2d
200 (1989).
26. Id. at 788-89, 379 S.E.2d at 80 (rejecting the argument that "the intention of the
legislature in amending [section] 50-13.8 was not to relieve a parent of the obligation to
support an adult child who is mentally or physically incapable of self-support.").
27. 102 N.C. App. 574,402 S.E.2d 869 (1991).
28. Id. at 575-76, 402 S.E.2d at 870 (ruling that parents can contract by consent
judgment to order the non-custodial parent to continue paying child support past the age
of majority, but that such an order "had no legal basis").
29. 143 N.C. App. 544,545 S.E.2d 779 (2001).
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curriculum." In Hendricks, the plaintiff-father, John Hendricks, and
defendant-mother, Deborah Sanks, were the parents of two children.
The younger child, John, III, was born with Down syndrome in 1981.31
In 1991, a trial court awarded custody of the two children to
Hendricks and ordered Sanks to pay child support.32 In 1999, when
John turned eighteen years old, Sanks moved to terminate support
for him, although John still attended special education classes at a
local high school. 33 The trial court applied the education exception
under section 50-13.4(c)(2) and ordered Sanks to continue making
child support payments on behalf of John until he reached the age of
4
twenty or graduated from high school, whichever occurred first.3
Sanks appealed and argued that because John had reached the
age of eighteen, he was not entitled to continued support under
section 50-13.4. 35 Where a child is eighteen years old and enrolled in
primary or secondary school, the obligor, in this case Sanks, has an
affirmative duty when moving to terminate child support to show that
the child is not making satisfactory progress toward graduation. 36
Thus, the key question addressed in Hendricks became whether John
was "making satisfactory academic progress toward graduation within
''37
the meaning of [section] 50-13.4(c)(2).
The court of appeals held that even though John was enrolled in
a special education program, he nevertheless was attending school
and making satisfactory progress toward a non-traditional
graduation, 38 and this progress met the statutory requirements under
30. Id. at 545, 545 S.E.2d at 780. The court also addressed whether a trial court can
merely halve the amount due under a prior order where support is mandated and one of
the two children earlier provided for is no longer entitled to support. Id. This issue is
beyond the scope of this Recent Development.
31. Id. at 546, 545 S.E.2d at 780.
32. Id. The trial court ordered Sanks to pay $805.50 per month in total child support.
Id.
33. Id. Although John was not making progress toward a traditional graduation, he
regularly participated in a non-traditional curriculum and was making satisfactory progress
toward a graduation based on John achieving certain goals tailored to his individualized
needs and capabilities. Id.
34. Id. The trial court denied Sanks's motion to terminate John's support and set the
amount of support at one-half of the total amount Sanks had been paying for both of her
children. Id.
35. Defendant-Appellant's Revised Brief at 5-6, Hendricks (No. COA0O-91). Sanks
also relied on Jackson to argue that the order requiring her to continue supporting John
had no legal basis. Id. at 6. The court, although agreeing with the holding in Jackson,
distinguished the facts in Hendricks. See Hendricks, 143 N.C. App. at 547, 545 S.E.2d at
781 (noting that the child in question in Jackson did not attend school).
36. See Leak v. Leak, 129 N.C. App. 142, 148-49,497 S.E.2d 702,705-06 (1998).
37. Hendricks, 143 N.C. App. at 547,545 S.E.2d at 781.
38. The trial court found that John was enrolled in a secondary school, was receiving
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section 50-13.4(c)(2).
The court noted that if John were not
mentally disabled and were enrolled in a traditional curriculum,
support would continue.' The court concluded that "[t]o treat a
mentally disabled child any differently than a mainstream child in
terms of support obligations would be patently unfair, against public
policy and not in keeping with the legislative directive."41
The court of appeals in Hendricks correctly interpreted section
50-13.4(c)(2) to allow John, an eighteen-year old disabled child, to
continue to receive support until he reached the age of twenty or
graduated from his special education program. In this sense, the
holding in Hendricks is a small step toward providing continued
support of disabled children beyond the age of majority in North
Carolina by allowing disabled children enrolled in alternative
educational programs to continue to receive child support, if only for
a limited time. The court could not take a larger step toward
providing continued support regardless of age, however, because
precedent required the court to interpret section 50-13.4(c)(2) under
its plain meaning4' and to defer to the intent of the legislature.43
As evidenced by the court's decision in Hendricks, the court
system cannot provide a complete remedy for the continued support
of disabled children beyond the age of twenty. This responsibility lies
with the General Assembly. This Recent Development argues that
the General Assembly should reinstate the obligation of a parent to
support a disabled child beyond the age of majority for public policy
considerations' and to align North Carolina with other jurisdictions.45
all the training available to him in the special needs curriculum at the school, and was
progressing in this curriculum. Order of September 27, 1999, at 1-2, Hendricks (No.
COA0O-91).
39. Hendricks, 143 N.C. App. at 548, 545 S.E.2d at 781. When applying section 5013.4(c)(2) to the facts of this case, the court attached significance to evidence that: (1)
teachers and school counselors showed attending school was in John's best interests; (2) he
would continue to benefit from the curriculum; and (3) he was making satisfactory
progress toward an individualized graduation. Id.
40. Id. at 547,545 S.E.2d at 781.
41. Id.
42. North Carolina courts must follow the rule that "[w]hen the language of a statute
is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must
give the statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or
superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein." Yates v. Dowless, 93 N.C.
App. 787,788, 379 S.E.2d 79,80 (1989) (quoting In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236,239,244 S.E.2d
386,388-89 (1978)), affd per curiam, 325 N.C. 703,386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).
43. When enacting or amending a statute, "lilt is always presumed that the legislature
acted with care and deliberation and with full knowledge of prior and existing law." Id.
(quoting State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641,658, 174 S.E.2d 793,804 (1970)).
44. See infra notes 46-73 and accompanying text.
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Courts generally articulate two public policy rationales for

extending the obligation of child support to mentally or physically
disabled children beyond the age of majority: (1) the natural
obligation of parents to support their children,46 and (2) the need to
"protect the public from the burden of supporting a person who has a
parent ... able to support him."4 7 North Carolina courts have long
recognized that "[t]he duty of parents to provide for the maintenance
of their children is a principle of natural law." ' Under this view, the
obligation of parental support continues until the child can provide
for his own maintenance.49 Finding that a disabled child "may have
the same need of support, care and maintenance after reaching [the
age of majority] as before," the North Carolina Supreme Court in
1947 held that "the dictates of humanity" require that the obligation
50
to support a disabled child does not terminate at the age of majority.
The court also recognized "parents as the most fit and proper
persons" to provide support and maintenance for those needs."
North Carolina's strong public policy of holding parents responsible
for the support of their children is evidenced by the severe penalties
52
imposed on parents who are delinquent in their support payments.
Other jurisdictions also recognize that parents have both a moral and
legal duty to support and maintain their mentally or physically
disabled children.53
45. See infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Crain v. Mallone, 113 S.W. 67, 68 (Ky. 1908) (holding that the continued
support of disabled children beyond the age of majority is the "natural as well as the legal
obligation").
47. Chun v. Chun, 235 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (interpreting
California code as requiring a father to support his emotionally disabled child beyond the
age of majority).
48. Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 616, 44 S.E.2d 31, 33 (1947) (quoting 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 419 (Lewis ed. 1898)).
49. Id. at 617, 44 S.E.2d at 33 (quoting 2 KENT ON AMERICAN LAW 190 (O.W.
Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1878)).
50. Id. at 617, 44 S.E.2d at 34 (emphatically answering "No" to the question of
whether a father's obligation to support his disabled child terminated at the age of
majority).
51. Id. at 617, 44 S.E.2d at 33 (quoting 2 KENT ON AMERICAN LAW 190 (O.W.
Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1878)).
52. For example, a parent's failure to pay child support obligations may result in the
restriction of the issuance or renewal of a driver's license, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17(b)(1)
(2001); restriction of the issuance or renewal of hunting, fishing, or occupational licensing
privileges, § 50-13.12; placement of a lien on real or personal property, § 44-86(b);
revocation of probation, § 15A-1344.1(d); or imprisonment for civil contempt, § 5A-21.
53. See, e.g., Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ohio 1984) (imposing a duty on
parents to support mentally or physically disabled children beyond the age of majority);
see also Feinberg v. Diamant, 389 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (Mass. 1979) (quoting with approval
Crain v. Malone, 113 S.W. 67,68 (Ky. 1908)).
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The second public policy rationale for requiring parents to
support their disabled children beyond the age of majority is that
society should not be financially responsible for individuals with
relatives who are able to support them. 4
In Hendricks, the
defendant-mother argued that a failure to provide support for a
disabled child who reaches the age of majority is not against public
policy because a disabled adult is eligible for public benefits.5 A
disabled child may continue to receive Supplemental Security Income
("SSI") benefits after she reaches the age of eighteen. 6 The SSI
payment, however, may be lower than the amount paid to the child
during her minority.5 7 In any event, these benefits often do not cover
all of the expenses associated with caring for a disabled adult child 8

54. This rationale is the basis of the so-called "poor statutes" and also applies to adult
children who become disabled post-majority. See Harlow, supra note 13, at 929-31
(discussing poor statutes, which, in some jurisdictions, revive the parental duty to support
an adult child whose disabilities arise post-majority). Contra Beiter v. Beiter, 539
N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (1989) (interpreting the purpose of New York's statutory scheme
addressing the support of disabled children as limiting the responsibility of the parent and
putting the burden on the state).
55. Defendant-Appellant's Revised Brief at 7, Hendricks (No. COAOO-91) (arguing
that eligibility for Supplemental Security Income would exist regardless of the child's
attendance at a secondary school). Sanks also argued that receiving child support might
actually decrease the amount of assistance to which a disabled child would otherwise be
entitled under federal law. Id.
56. Soc. Sec. Admin., Benefits for Children with Disabilities, available at
http://www.ssa.govlpubs/10026.html (August 2001) (last visited August 21, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (explaining that disabled children under the age of
eighteen may qualify for SSI benefits if they come from homes with limited incomes and
resources, but once a child turns eighteen, the government no longer considers the
parents' income and assets when determining eligibility for SSI benefits).
57. A lower SSI payment rate may apply if a disabled child receiving SSI benefits
turns eighteen and continues to live with her parents, but does not pay for food or shelter.
Id. In addition, an adult disabled child will not qualify for SSI benefits if she has
"countable resources" in excess of $2000 or "countable income" in excess of the Federal
Benefit Rate. See Federal Consumer Information Center, Planning for Your Special
Needs Child, available at http://wwwv.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic-text/children/special-child/
special3.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Furthermore, SSI payments are reduced by the amount of any "countable income"
received by an SSI recipient. Id. To remain eligible for SSI benefits under the current
guidelines, a disabled adult is allowed to receive only $60 of unearned income per quarter
and must be incapable of earning more than $500 per month. See Pamela Forbat, Serving
Special Needs Kids, REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE, Sept. 2001, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Registered Representative File. If a person lives in a group home, the state
typically will take three-fourths of the monthly benefit. Id.
58. Under the current Social Security Administration's Supplemental Security Income
program, a disabled child would only receive $512 per month. See Randy Neumann, How
to Provide for a Disabled Child, at http://moneycentral.msn.com/articles/familykids/
1443.asp (last visited May 4, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The
cost of caring for a disabled child can run from $20,000 to $75,000 per year. See Humberto
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The obligation of parental support should not end for disabled
children just because they reach the age of majority. Although legal
significance attaches when a child reaches the age of majority, 59 this
age is an artificial benchmark for most disabled children. 60 A disabled
child most likely will continue to depend on his parent(s) for support
after reaching the age of majority. 61 The obligation of parental
support should be based on the child's needs and not the simple fact
that the child turned eighteen years old.6'
Although disabled children often continue to need specialized
care after they reach the age of majority,63 public education services
are no longer available. 64 Parents of disabled children commonly
refer to this period as entering the "black hole."' s Disabled children
and their custodial parents often find that opportunities for
specialized daycare and education are limited once the child ages out
of the public education system. 6 The responsibility of caring for the
child then reverts back to the custodial parent.67
Cruz & Diane Lade, Special-Needs Kids Rely on Solid Plans, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale, Fl.), Aug. 21, 2000, at 22, available at LEXIS, News Library, Sun-Sentinel
(Fort Lauderdale, Fl.) File (noting also that $350,000 to $400,000 will likely be required to
fund a special-needs trust to care for a disabled child in the event of their parents' death).
59. For example, the child's eligibility for or level of benefits from state or federal
programs may change upon reaching the age of majority. See infra notes 60-62 and
accompanying text.
60. Nelson v. Nelson, 548 A.2d 109, 118-19 (D.C. 1988) (concluding that reaching the
age of majority does not diminish a disabled child's need for continued support); see also
Whitaker, supranote 3.
61. Id. at 116 (noting with approval that the D.C. Superior Court concluded that
incapacitated adult children, like minors, depend on their parents for support).
62. See Matthew Bogin, Parental Duties Expanded.- D.C.'s Retarded Adults Gain
Right to Support, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 5, 1987, at 8 (discussing the D.C. Superior Court's
decision in Nelson v. Nelson).
63. See Whitaker, supra note 3.
64. Although North Carolina provides free public education for every child with
special needs, state support for such education continues only through the age of twentyone. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106 (2001).
65. E-mail from William A. Hatch, Associate, Hutson Hughes & Powell, P.A.,
(former Assistant General Counsel, Governor's Advocacy Counsel for Persons with
Disabilities), to the author (April 8, 2002, 09:53 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
66. See Diana Ornitz, Life Goes On After Gateway, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro,
N.C.), Jun. 27, 2001, at People & Places pg. 1 (describing the difficulties parents face in
finding day programs suitable for severely handicapped children once they are no longer
eligible for public school programs because of their age).
67. See, e.g., Alex Wayne, Program Opens Door for Disabled Adults, NEWS &
RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), Feb. 11, 2002, at B1 (noting the lack of opportunities for
disabled children once they age out of public school programs and describing the opening
of a new daycare facility for disabled adults, one of only five in the state); see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115C-106 (2001).
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Absent support from the non-custodial parent, a custodial parent
may be forced to rely significantly on state support." Reliance on
state support, however, may put these parents in a vulnerable
position. 69 For example, North Carolina's current budget crisis is
adversely affecting funding for programs, such as Medicaid, which
provide financial assistance for the medical care of the disabled.70 As
a result, some critical services for disabled citizens have been frozen.71
These proposed cuts do not represent the first time in recent years
that North Carolina agencies 72 have been forced to reduce benefits
and services for disabled persons. Such changes in legislation often
leave families in limbo.73 Because of the volatility in the funding of

services for the disabled, the obligation of a parent to continue
support beyond the age of majority should not be entirely removed
even if a disabled child receives some public assistance.
Beyond public policy considerations, the General Assembly
should reinstate the statutory duty of parents to support their

disabled children beyond the age of majority to align North Carolina
with the majority of jurisdictions. North Carolina is currently part of
a distinct minority of jurisdictions that do not provide for this
continued support either through the common law or by statute.7 4
68. Alan Scher Zagier, A Beacon of Hope to Parents,NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Jun. 22, 1999, at Al (describing the need for state support in raising a disabled child
and noting that, at one time, parents moved to North Carolina, in part, because of the
superior services available for treating mental retardation and other developmental
disabilities).
69. Editorial, Cruel Silence, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 12, 2002, at
A26 (arguing that the state government, even when faced with a budget deficit, should
continue to assist families in caring for a handicapped or disabled child).
70. Catherine Clabby, Medicaid Cuts May Not Need to Run so Deep, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 27, 2002, at Al (describing projected shortfalls in North
Carolina's Medicaid program); Wade Rawlins & Amy Gardner, N.C. Cupboard is Bare,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 26, 2002, at Al (describing the current budget
crisis in North Carolina and spending cuts in services to the disabled and mentally ill
proposed by the Governor and the General Assembly).
71. Clabby, supra note 70 (noting that the state has frozen funding for the community
alternative program designed to provide non-institutionalized housing for mentally
disabled persons).
72. See, e.g., Barbara Barrett, Durham Mental-Health Services in Peril, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 7, 2000, at B1 (describing cuts in Durham County's
services for mentally ill and disabled residents stemming from North Carolina's obligation
to repay $74 million to the federal government for state agencies' improper use of
Medicaid monies).
73. See, e.g., James Eli Shiffer, A Law That Leaves Families in Limbo, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 3, 1997, at Al (illustrating that cuts in SSI payments and
changes in the definition of disability can have a severe impact on families).
74. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text. As few as seven jurisdictions
explicitly do not provide for the continued support of disabled children past the age of
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Some of these minority jurisdictions, including North Carolina,
abrogated the common law duty of continued support by statute.75
Other jurisdictions have interpreted their statutes as providing no
authority for the continued support of disabled children beyond the
age of majority.7 6 Some minority jurisdictions, including North
Carolina, do, however, provide an education exception for postmajority child support, but do not allow for exceptions due to
disabilities.77
In contrast to North Carolina's restrictive treatment of disabled
children, a majority of states provide for the continued support of a
disabled child until the child overcomes the disability or becomes selfsufficient. These jurisdictions fall into one of two general categories:
those that impose a statutory duty on parents to continue support for
their physically or mentally disabled children beyond the age of

majority.
75. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15(e) (1999). Georgia courts have found that
there is no statutory exception to the general rule that a "father's obligation to provide for
the maintenance, protection and education of his child ceases when the child becomes
[twenty-one] years of age." Crane v. Crane, 170 S.E.2d 392, 393 (Ga. 1969) (noting that
the Georgia General Assembly, if it so desired, could make an exception for children who
are disabled at birth or become disabled later on and remain so after reaching majority);
see also supra notes 22-28 describing North Carolina provisions.
76. See Smith v. Smith, 447 N.W.2d 715,716 (Mich. 1989) (concluding that the duty to
support a disabled child beyond the age of majority was repealed by the Age of Majority
Act); Meyers v. Meyers, 383 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Neb. 1986) (holding that child support
statute confers no authority to compel parents to support adult children); Beiter v. Beiter,
539 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272-73 (1989) (holding that a Family Court Act imposes no duty to
support a disabled adult child and a parent's obligation to support a child ceases when the
child reaches the age of twenty-one regardless of whether the child is physically or
mentally handicapped); Day v. Gatewood, No. 02A01-9805-CV-00141, 1999 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 285, at *11 (Tenn. App. Apr. 30, 1999) (finding nothing in Tennessee's domestic
relations statutes authorizing a court to exercise jurisdiction over a child who is over
eighteen years old). Contra W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-11-103(b) (Michie 2001), amended
by Act of March 9, 2002, ch. 101, 2002 W. Va. Acts (stating that nothing in the statute
providing for support beyond the age of majority "shall be construed to abrogate or
modify existing case law regarding the eligibility of handicapped or disabled children to
receive child support beyond the age of eighteen").
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c)(2); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501 (1999)
(providing a duty of support up to the age of nineteen for a child over the age of eighteen
who is a student in high school and is likely to graduate); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15(e)
(1999) (providing a duty of support up to the age of twenty for a child who has reached the
age of majority and is enrolled and attending secondary school).
78. See generally Laura Wish Morgan, SupportGuidelines.com, The Duty to Support
Adult Disabled Children, available at http:llwww.SupportGuidelines.comlarticles/art
200003.html (last visited May 4, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(stating that most jurisdictions impose an obligation on parents to support their disabled
children beyond the age of majority).
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majority79 and those that continue to impose the duty under the
common law rule. 80
Statutes adopted by some jurisdictions providing for the
continued support of disabled children beyond the age of majority
codify verbatim the common law rule.81 North Carolina fit into this
category before it abrogated the parental duty of such support.' On
the other hand, jurisdictions that continue to follow the common law
rule 83 generally hold that the presumption of emancipation upon
attaining majority may be overcome by evidence that the adult child
is incapable of supporting himself due to a physical or mental
disability. 4
79. See id. (providing a state-by-state survey of parental support obligations for
disabled children beyond the age of majority). At least thirty states have adopted statutes
that require continued support for disabled children beyond the age of majority. Id.
80. See id. (noting that at least ten jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia,
continue to follow the common law rule).
81. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.340(4) (West Supp. 2002) (codifying the common
law rule that "[if] the child is physically or mentally incapacitated from supporting himself
and insolvent and unmarried, the court may extend the parental support obligation past
the child's eighteenth birthday"). Other jurisdictions have adopted statutes that provide
for the continued support of disabled children beyond the age of majority by defining
"minor child" or "child" to include disabled children of any age that are incapable of
supporting themselves. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.54(2) (West 1990) (including in
the definition of "child" someone who is incapable of self-support because of a physical or
mental condition); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 125B.200(2)(c) (Michie 2001) (including under
the definition of "minor child" a person who is "[u]nder a legal disability"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3109.01 (Anderson 2000) (defining the "age of majority" to exclude those
persons under a legal disability); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-2(6)(c) (Supp. 2001) (defining
"child" to include "a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living
and ... is not able to support self by own means"). Some jurisdictions do not address the
continued support of disabled children beyond the age of majority directly, but recognize a
parental duty to support an adult child who is incapable of supporting themselves under so
called "poor statutes." See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-1002 (Michie 1996) (codifying the
reciprocal duty of parents and children to support family members who are unable to
support themselves); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 12 (West 1998) (requiring a parent to
support a child who is unable to maintain himself by work); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.010
(1999) (requiring parents "to maintain their children who are poor and unable to work to
maintain themselves"). Likewise, a few jurisdictions define the parental obligation of
support of an adult child in broad terms that could include indigent, as well as mentally or
physically disabled, children. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910(a) (West 1994) (providing
that parents have a responsibility to maintain "a child of whatever age who is
incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means"); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 580-47(a) (Supp. 2000) (providing for support for an "incompetent adult child").
82. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Laterra ex rel. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Treaster, 844 P.2d 724, 732
(Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that a parent has no legal duty to support a child beyond
the age of majority, unless that child is physically or mentally unable to maintain and
support herself); Feinberg v. Diamant, 389 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (Mass. 1979) (following the
common law rule obligating a parent to care for an adult child incapable of self-support).
84. See, e.g., Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798, 800 (Alaska 1989) (holding that a parent's
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North Carolina has several options to remedy the current
inequities imposed by section 50-13.4 and to align itself with the
majority of jurisdictions that mandate parental support of disabled
children beyond the age of majority. Several jurisdictions that have
adopted statutes providing for the continued support of a disabled
child beyond the age of majority also include an education exception,
similar to the provisions in existing section 50-13.4(c)(2), for children
attending school and making progress toward graduationY
The
General Assembly could amend current section 50-13.4(c)(2), which
contains an education exception, to allow an additional exception for
the support of children beyond the age of majority who are unable to
support themselves because of a physical or mental disability. Such
an amendment would return the status of disabled children to its
position before the General Assembly abrogated the right to
continued support in the late 1970s and early 1980s.6
The General Assembly could also adopt guidelines to determine
whether a disabled child is eligible for continued support beyond the
age of majority.8 7 Many jurisdictions that continue to follow the
common law rule have developed such guidelines. For example,
before ordering continued support of a disabled child, Alabama
courts must determine that (1) the child is not capable of earning an
income sufficient to provide for her reasonable living expenses and
(2) the child's mental or physical disability is the cause of her inability
to earn that income. 8 The first prong of this test is similar to the
duty of support continues after the child reaches the age of majority if the child is
incapable of self-support because of a physical or mental disability). One jurisdiction, in
the absence of any statutory authority, allows for the continued support of disabled
children beyond the age of majority under "special circumstances." See Martin v. Martin,
No. FA9400567925, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3254, at *4-6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 13,
2001) (interpreting presumptive child support guidelines to allow for continued support to
disabled children beyond the age of majority under special circumstances).
85. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1(9) (West 2001) (providing for parental support
of a child "between the ages of eighteen and nineteen years who is engaged full-time in
completing high school graduation" and "may include support for a child of any age" who
cannot support himself because of a disability); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(17) (Law. Coop. Supp. 2001) (providing support for a child "making satisfactory progress toward
completion of high school, not to exceed the nineteenth birthday"); VA. CODE ANN. § 20124.2(C) (Michie 2000) (providing support for a full-time high school student until the
child reaches the age of nineteen or graduates, whichever comes first).
86. See supranotes 15-23 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Exparte Cohen, 763 So. 2d 253,256 (Ala. 1999) (adopting a two-part test
for determining whether a disabled child is entitled to support beyond the age of
majority).
88. Id. (directing the trial court on remand to determine whether a child who broke
his neck after graduating high school and remained a quadriparetic is unable to support
himself and thus entitled to post-minority support). As in Alabama, the duty to support a
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common law rule for continued support of a disabled child beyond
the age of majority. The second prong of the test offers protection
against a parent's obligation to support children who choose not to
earn a sufficient income, but whose mental or physical disability does
not limit their earning capacity, i.e., an indigent adult child who is not
disabled.8 9 If the General Assembly were concerned that indigent
adult children would sue their parents for support, it could limit
support to those children with disabilities that existed before they
reached the age of majority. Several jurisdictions provide for such a
limitation 0
By amending section 50-13.4(c)(2) to provide for the support of
disabled children past the age of majority, the General Assembly
would also reconcile the current child support provisions with the
child custody provisions in section 50-13.8. As these two sections are
currently written, custody of disabled children beyond the age of
majority is addressed without providing any means for continued
support.91 The creation of these inconsistent sections does not appear
to be a legislative oversight. The General Assembly has had several
chances to remedy this inconsistency but failed to do so each time.'
In an ideal world, the obligation of a parent to continue
supporting a disabled child once that child reaches the age of majority
would be "so well secured by the strength of natural affection" that it

disabled child beyond the age of majority in Maryland arises "when the child has
insufficient resources and, because of mental or physical infirmity, insufficient income
capacity to enable him to meet his reasonableliving expenses." Presley v. Presley, 500
A.2d 322, 328 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). Missouri courts have adopted a test similar to
the second prong of the Alabama standard by holding that to require support for a
disabled child beyond the age of majority, the trial court must find a causal relationship
between the adult child's inability to support herself and that child's mental or physical
disability. See Missouri ex rel. Albert v. Sauer, 869 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
89. Adoption of these guidelines may quell fears that parents would be obligated to
support indigent children who are not disabled but choose not to support themselves.
Such fears represent a criticism of California's broad statutory language. See Leslie
Parrilla, Support Orders for Adult Sons Rankle Parents,VENTURA CO. STAR, Aug. 18,
2001, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (criticizing recent California cases in which
parents were held responsible for the support of their indigent or disabled adult children
as opening the doors to adult children suing their parents for support).
90. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.302(2) (Vernon Supp. 2002) (limiting
support under circumstances where "the disability exists, or the cause of the disability is
known to exist, on or before the [eighteenth] birthday of the child"); Cohn v. Cohn, 1996NMCA-No. 16409, 934 P.2d 279, 281 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that parents have a
continuing duty to support an adult child if the child was disabled before reaching the age
of majority).
91. See supranotes 18-19 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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would not have to be enforced by human laws. 93 Unfortunately, that
is not always the case. All too often, the court system is called upon
to resolve child support issues. These issues become even more
critical when they involve a disabled child who is incapable of selfsupport. The current North Carolina statutory scheme does not
provide the court system with the necessary authority to order
parents to provide continued support of a disabled child beyond the
age of majority, when these children and their custodial parents are
often the most in need of such support. The North Carolina General
Assembly should remedy this injustice by amending section 50-13.4 to
require such support.
JEFFREY W. CHILDERS

93. Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 616, 44 S.E.2d 31, 33 (1947) (quoting 2 KENT ON
AMERICAN LAW 190 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1873).

